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Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 316, the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC" or "Commission") is responsible for evaluating licensing assignments
and ensuring their consistency with the public interest. In 2001, the Intemational Bureau of the FCC assigned licenses to eight satellite companies to operate in the 2 GHz mobile satellite service ("MSS") spectrum band. The Commission, however, made these assignments contingent on the companies meeting certain milestone obligations. By early 2005, six of the eight MSS satellite
operators lost their licenses due to either cancellation or surrender. This situation left only two MSS operators in the 2 GHz band: TMI Communications
and Company Limited Partnership ("TMI") and ICO Satellite Services
("ICO"). Deciding what to do with the canceled and surrendered bandwidth,
the Commission initially expressed an intent to increase the assignments to
TMI and ICO so that each would have 1/3 of the total 2 GHz spectrum. The
Commission also invited comments on what to do with the other 1/3 of the
spectrum unassigned under this proposed plan. In this Order the Commission
reviews several reallocation options and ultimately distributes the entire 2 GHz
spectrum, not just 2/3, evenly between TMI and ICO.
The Commission began this order by clarifying that its Third A WS Order'
and First Space Station Licensing Reform Order' affecting 2 GHz bands did
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not limit its ability to determine if and how 2 GHz MSS bands should be redistributed at the present time. The Commission recognized its only limitation in
forming a reallocation decision is that it must be in the public interest pursuant
to § 316. The Commission then considered three options for reallocating the
canceled and surrendered 2 GHz spectrum. The first option was to assign the
remaining 2 GHz spectrum to TMI and ICO, the second was to assign it to new
MSS licensees, and the third was to make the spectrum available to another
service. The Commission found no reasons in the record supporting an assignment to other services. The Commission declined to divide the spectrum
amongst new licensees, preferring instead to rely on market forces under the
milestone requirements to efficiently determine the optimal number of licensees.
Finally, having eliminated other options, the Commission determined that a
division of all unassigned spectrum between TMI and ICO would be the best
solution and in the public's interest. The Commission stated that its decision
would: (1) allow ICO and TMI to better provide crucial communications services to first responders in an emergency such as the recent September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks and hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma; (2) facilitate
delivery of broadband services to rural areas; (3) promote competition of MSS
technology with other mobile telecommunications services; and (4) facilitate
international service offerings. The only possible reevaluation of this decision
anticipated by the FCC is if the pending appeal from Globalstar, who had its 2
GHz MSS license canceled, is successful.
Summarized by Justin P. Hedge
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In February 2006, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") issued
a Further Report on the Packaging and Sale of Video Programming Services to
the Public ("Further Report"). This report reexamines a November 2004 Report ("2004 Report") submitted to Congress on the d la carte model of delivering video programming. Report on the Packaging and Sale of Video Program2004),
18,
(Nov.
Public
the
to
Services
ming
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-254432A 1.pdf. The
Further Report concluded that consumers would benefit from an d la carte
model and discusses several options under this model which would give subscribers the ability to increase their choices in purchasing programming.
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The 2004 Report relied on a study conducted by Booz Allen Hamilton
("Booz Allen") which concluded that the A la carte model is not economical.
The Further Report describes the errors in the Booz Allen study which rendered the conclusions in the 2004 Report incorrect. Additionally, the Further
Report identifies impracticable assumptions and biased analysis in the conclusions of the 2004 Report.
The first error the Further Report assigns to the Booz Allen study is the underestimation of the number of programming channels available to the subscriber at a more affordable rate under the A la carte model compared to the
current costs of a multichannel video programming distributor ("MVPD"). The
Booz Allen study failed to recognize that under the A la carte model subscribers
could maximize the benefits they receive from cable television by choosing to
purchase a small number of high priced channels or a large number of less expensive channels. Once this error was corrected in the Further Report the FCC
found consumers' bills could decrease by 3% to 13% in three out of four of the
Booz Allen study scenarios.
Additionally, the Further Report finds the Booz Allen study may have further overestimated the costs of the A la carte model by assuming that a shift
towards the A la carte model would reduce the amount of television consumers
watch and impact advertising revenues. The Further Report rejects this assumption and finds no reason consumers would reduce their television consumption given the ability to choose the channels they receive. The Further
Report believes the introduction of the d la carte model would not change overall audience levels and therefore there is no reason to conclude consumption
levels would drop. The Further Report also finds advertising revenues may
increase because strong d la carte sales will indicate popularity and advertisers
will no longer need to rely on the cable operator's guess about a network's
popularity.
The final error the Further Report discusses is the overstatement by the Booz
Allen study regarding the average price per cable channel. This mistake has
been acknowledged by Booz Allen and confirmed by other economists. The
error results from the failure of the Booz Allen study to net out the cost of
broadcast stations when calculating the average cost of a channel under the A la
carte model. The Further Report finds that even with this error if the A la carte
model is only implemented on digital cable systems consumers' could expect a
1.97 % decrease in their cable bills. This finding was not included in the 2004
Report.
In addition to discussing the above errors the Further Report examines several options under the A la carte model. The first option, mixed bundling,
would give consumers the choice to purchase channels individually at a set
price or to purchase the bundles provided by a MVPD. The Further Report
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recognizes MVPDs already have some experience selling channels A la carte or
in smaller bundles with purchase premium channels, pay-per-view programming, and Video-On-Demand programming. The benefits of mix bundling
would include an increased choice for consumers-allowing consumers who
are not interested in the bundles offered to participate in the A la carte model
and purchase only the channels they want. The Further Report recognizes this
option will alleviate many concerns expressed by the networks about their
costs under a pure A la carte model.
Another option discussed by the Further Report is a themed-tiers model under which MVPDs would offer a number of tiers of digital programming with a
particular theme. This model would allow a consumer to subscribe to the genre
of programming that appeals to him or her. The Further Report finds this option would allow consumers to benefit from some of the economic advantages
of bundling while still only paying for networks they find interesting.
Finally, the Further Report suggests subscriber-selected tiers as an option
under the A la carte model. This option differs from the themed-tier model because subscribers are not restricted to the networks MVPD bundles together.
Each tier would contain a prescribed number of channels for a set price and the
consumer is able to fill the tier with the channels he or she prefers and would
be smaller than the MVPD's bundles, which would also be available for purchase. The Further Report notes this option is already being offered by a few
Canadian cable operators. Subscriber-selected tiers would allow consumers to
avoid paying for networks they do not watch and would provide feedback to
MVPDs and advertisers as to the popularity of each network.
The Booz Allen study, upon which the 2004 Report relied, contained many
errors leading the FCC to inaccurate conclusions. Upon reexamination of the
issue the Further Report concludes an A la carte model would benefit consumers by increasing consumer control over video programming. The Further Report's discussion of mixed-bundles, themed tiers, and subscriber-selected tiers
offers potential benefits to consumers when compared to pure bundling and
merits further consideration.
Summarized by M Megan McCune
In re Children's Television Obligations of Digital Television Broadcasters, Order Extending Effective Date, 20 F.C.C.R. 20,611 (Dec. 16, 2005)
On December 16, 2005, the Federal Communications Commission ("Commission") adopted an Order that extended the effective date of the rules
adopted in an earlier Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("Report and Order") a 2004 proceeding. See 19 F.C.C.R. 22,943
(Sept. 9, 2004). The extension comes in response to several petitions for recon-
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sideration and for judicial review of the adopted rules.
The rules, adopted in the September 2004 Report and Order, addressed the
obligations of digital television ("DTV") broadcasters with respect to providing educational and informational programming for children. Six rules were
promulgated in that Order. The first rule increased the children's television
obligation of DTV broadcasters' choosing to multicast on their digital spectrum. The second rule limited the number of preemptions of children's television allotted quarterly to both analog and digital broadcasters. The third rule
required both analog and digital broadcasters to identify children's programming on screen with an "E/I" symbol in order for the programming to count
toward the broadcaster's core children's television obligation. The fourth rule
obligated digital broadcasters to comply with commercial limits and policies in
programming directed at children twelve and under. The fifth rule related to
whether displaying Internet websites during children's programming counts
toward commercial time limits. The last rule defined "commercial matter" to
include promotion of non-children's educational and informational programming.
Opposition to the rules as adopted in the Order were opposed both by advocates for children's television programming and by broadcast and cable industry members. Their disagreements led to the petitions for reconsideration and
the judicial review currently underway. Since filing their petitions, those parties have notified the Commission that they are working together to reconcile
their differences and may jointly recommend rules that would satisfy their respective concerns.
In response to this notification, the Commission found that postponing the
effective date of the rules previously adopted would facilitate the rulemaking
process. The extension would give the Commission time to consider any forthcoming joint proposals, prevent resources wasted by the industry in complying
with rules that may no longer be valid, and render further litigation of the rules
moot. In light of the efficiencies arising out of postponing the effective date of
the rules, the Commission moved the rules' effective date to sixty days after
publication in the Federal Register of the Commission's Order on Reconsideration.
Summarized by Gaetano Parrinello
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In re Implementation of Section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 as amended by the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
20 F.C.C.R. 18,581 (Nov. 3, 2005)
On November 3, 2005, the Federal Communications Commission ("Commission") adopted a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("Notice") regarding the
implementation of § 621(a)(1) of the Communications Act of 1934 as
amended. The Notice comes in response to allegations that the current practices of cable local franchising authorities ("LFAs") serve as a barrier to entry
for potential competitive multichannel video programming distributors
("MVPDs").
In the Notice, the Commission recognized that most consumers have considerable choice as to the source of their video services, but also noted that
additional MVPD choices are beneficial to consumers. Of particular interest to
the Commission in this proceeding is the ability, in light of the advances in
broadband services, of companies traditionally viewed as telephone companies
to enter and compete in the video market.
The Notice explains that traditional telephone companies seeking entry into
the video market are faced with the initial regulatory hurdle of obtaining a cable franchise from the LFA. Telephone companies such as Verizon complain
that the franchising process is an unreasonable delay and a barrier to their
competitive entry to the MVPD market. Verizon specifically asserts that the
process impedes widespread cable competition by requiring separate, timeconsuming negotiations with thousands of LFAs. In addition, Verizon claims
the process gives incumbent MVPDs the opportunity to prolong the franchise
approval process for competitors and entrench themselves in the market by
forcing build-out requirements upon potential competitors, and by subjecting
competitors to LFA demands unrelated to the deployment of video services.
According to the Commission, however, many new entrants have been able
to obtain cable franchises, and several states have or are considering laws allowing for expedited statewide franchising. Moreover, the Commission recognizes the importance of franchises, and seeks to balance the legitimate policy
objectives of LFAs against the federal policy objective of fostering competition in multichannel video programming and broadband deployment.
The Commission, with this proceeding, endeavors to reconcile the alleged
barriers to competitive entry faced by competitive MVPDs with the importance
of LFAs in light of the overall federal policy objective of competition and
broadband deployment. To this end, the Commission sought comment on how
to implement § 621 (a)(1), which prohibits LFAs from unreasonably refusing to
award competitive MVPD franchises. In particular, the Commission is inter-

20061

Selected FCC Docket Summaries

ested in comments regarding the current ability of competitors to obtain franchises, the Commission's authority to adopt rules in this regard, and the steps
the Commission should take to prevent the franchising process from unreasonably interfering with competitive cable entry and rapid broadband deployment.
Comments in this proceeding were originally due January 17, 2006 and reply comments due February 16, 2006, however, due to a voluminous record,
the Commission extended the date for filing reply comments to March 28,
2006.
Summarized by ClareLiedquist
WIRELESS
In re Amendment of Part 2 of the Commission's Rules to Allocate Spectrum Below 3 GHz for Mobile and Fixed Services to Support the Introduction of New Advanced Wireless Services, including Third Generation
Wireless Systems, Eighth Report and Order, Fifth Notice of ProposedRule
Making and Order,20 F.C.C.R. 15,866 (Sept. 29, 2005)
In its September 29, 2005, Eighth Report and Order ("Order"), the Federal
Communications Commission ("Commission") examined ongoing efforts to
promote spectrum utilization and efficiency with regard to the provision of
new services, including Advanced Wireless Services ("AWS"). The Commission previously proposed that the 2155-2175 MHz band should be designated
for AWS use because of its adjacency to the 2110-2155 MHz band and because the allocation would complement the international allocation for a terrestrial component of advanced services at the 2110-2170 MHz band. The Commission noted considerable support for its proposal and cited propositions that
the tentative 2155-2175 MHz band could be best used to promote new technologies, such as AWS in paired or unpaired configurations. As a result, the
Commission decided that an additional spectrum was needed for AWS use.
The Commission allocated the 2155-2160 MHz band to Fixed and Mobile Services to allow AWS services in the band. The Commission explicitly left open
how the assignment of this new AWS service at 2155-2175 MHz would operate for further consideration in separate services rules proceedings. It also
highlighted the possibility for negotiating new or modified agreements to provide for more flexible use of the 2155-2175 MHz spectrum with Canada and
Mexico.
In the Fifth Notice, the Commission also sought comment on two specific
relocation procedures. First, the FCC sought comment the applicable procedures relating to the relocation of Broadband Radio Service ("BRS") opera-
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tions in the 2150-2160/62 MHz band. The Commission noted that any BRS
relocation procedure must account for the unique circumstances facing the current operations and the new AWS licensees. As a result, the Commission proposed to require new AWS entrants to relocate BRS operations on a link-bylink basis allowing each entrant to determine its own schedule. Where that
link-by-link basis would prove infeasible for certain operations, the Commission proposed requirements mandating that the AWS licensee relocate all incumbent BRS operations affected by the new AWS operations providing BRS
operators with comparable facilities. The Commission further projected to apply the current relocation policies regarding stations with primary and secondary status to the BRS. The licenses of 2.1 GHz licensees would be modified
and assigned 2.5 GHz spectrum in the same geographic areas. Because of current leasing arrangements between BRS-licensees and commercial operators,
the Commission offered to allow incumbent BRS licensees to rely on the
throughput, reliability, and operating costs of licensees in negotiating comparable facilities. In situations where BRS licensees continue to lease their spectrum to third parties after relocation, the licensee may include the lessee in negotiations, but the lessee would be barred from a separate right of recovery.
The right of relocation for licensees in need of license renewal is contingent
upon having the license renewed.
Second, the Commission sought comment on the procedures applicable to
Fixed Microwave Service ("FS") operations in the 2160-2175 MHz band. The
Commission proposed to generally follow its relocation policies explained in
In the Matter of Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the
Use of New Telecommunications Technologies, Second Memorandum Opinion and Order,9 F.C.C.R. 7797 (Nov. 28, 1994), aff'd, Ass 'n of Public Safety
Communications Officials-International,Inc. v. FCC, 76 F.3d 395 (D.C. Cir.
1996) ("Emerging Technologies"), as modified by subsequent decisions. The
Commission also weighed whether it should apply the single mandatory negotiation period applied to new technology entrants to FS relocation by AWS in
the 2160-2175 MHz band. Alternatively, the Commission additionally sought
comment as to whether each FS incumbent in the 2160-2175 MHz band
should be afforded a separate, individually triggered, negotiation period in contrast with the existing relocation rules. With regards to incumbent Part 22 services, the Commission considered whether and how to harmonize the relocation rules for Part 22 point-to-point microwave links and Part 101 fixed services described in Emerging Technologies.
In the Order, the Commission required BRS licensees in the 2150-2160/62
MHz band to provide information on the construction status and operational
parameters of each incumbent BRS system subject to relocation. The Commission cited the essential nature of providing reliable, public data of each incum-
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bent system subject to relocation prior to planned auction of the 2150-2160
MHz band in 2006. BRS licensees will be required to submit information on:
(1) the location and operating characteristics of BRS systems in the 21502160/62 MHz band; (2) other system characteristics of BRS incumbents (e.g.,
subscriber numbers and equipment types used); and (3) categories of services
provided (e.g., one-way or two-way service, point-to-point or point-tomultipoint operations, data or analog video service). BRS licensees will be
required to submit this information even if leasing the spectrum to third parties.
Because the relocation is proposed on a link-to-link basis, the Commission will
mandate BRS licensees to provide the number of links within the system for
point-to-point and point-to-multipoint systems. BRS services will be forced to
note the extent that BRS channels I and 2 are used as part of the same service.
That information will be collected and made publicly available through the
Commission's Universal Licensing System. The Commission delegated authority to the Office of Engineering and Technology and the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau to issue public notices of the specific data required of
the BRS licenses including the filing date and filing procedures for specific
information.
Summarized by Michael Lang
In re Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile
Radio Service Providers; Automatic and Manual Roaming Obligations
Pertaining to commercial Mobile Radio Services, Memorandum Opinion &
Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 15,047 (Aug. 24,
2005)
The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") released this Memorandum Opinion & Order ("MO&O") in an effort to revisit
their policies on roaming for commercial mobile radio service ("CMRS") providers. The MO&O closes WT Docket No. 00-193, which had been open since
the release of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPRM") in 2000. The FCC
used this docket to solicit comments regarding what the Commission's role
should be in terms of roaming regulations. The MO&O closed this document
because the landscape of the CMRS marketplace has changed significantly
since the comment period ended and the Commission viewed the comments in
the docket as stale.
In order to refresh the roaming record, the Commission issued a new NPRM
that focusing on the current state of roaming. The NPRM addressed two specific types of roaming: manual and automatic. With regards to manual roaming, the FCC sought comment on whether manual roaming is still used and to
what extent automatic roaming has rendered it obsolete. The Commission also
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sought input as to whether the mandatory roaming rule should be eliminated,
either with or without an automatic roaming regulation in place, or, in the alternative, kept as a fallback provision for those situations when automatic
roaming is unavailable.
The NPRM focused heavily on the need for an automatic roaming rule, soliciting comments from both those who would support such a measure and
those who would oppose it. The Commission noted that recent mergers have
changed the marketplace considerably and that these changes have had an impact on small and rural carriers. In framing the debate, the Commission endeavored to keep consumers at the forefront, inquiring as to the effect that the
current roaming environment has had on the availability, quality, and price of
roaming for consumers. The Commission also focused on how an automatic
roaming requirement would affect businesses, especially whether a roaming
regulation would add administrative costs or hamper developments in roaming
technology or in the development of a CMRS provider's network generally.
The remaining questions were broken down into three main categories:
roaming agreements; small and rural carrier concerns; and technical considerations. Under the roaming agreements category, the FCC framed its questions
with a focus on avoiding discrimination in the marketplace. The Commission
inquired whether there were sufficient roaming anti-discrimination policies and
remedies in place and whether it is discriminatory to permit CMRS providers
to offer roaming agreements to affiliates with different terms and conditions
than non-affiliates. With regards to small and rural carrier concerns, the FCC
voiced concern that recent mergers will allow large CMRS providers to use
their market power to adversely affect roaming negotiations. As a result the
Commission questioned whether asymmetrical roaming rates were discriminatory against smaller providers and whether it was acceptable to have rules that
apply only in a regional or local basis. Finally, from a technical standpoint, the
Commission queried how technological differences and upgrades between carriers will affect a roaming requirement and whether providers should only be
mandated into roaming agreements with other providers using similar technology.
Summarized by Michael Saperstein

20061

Selected FCC Docket Summaries

WIRELINE
In re Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Telecommunications Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and other Customer Information; Petition for Rulemaking to Enhance Security and Authentication Standards for Access to Customer
Proprietary Network Information, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 21
F.C.C.R. 1782 (Feb. 10, 2006)
On February 14, 2006 the Federal Communications Commission ("Commission") released this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeking comments on
what steps, if any, it should take to further protect Customer Proprietary Network Information ("CPNI") from unauthorized disclosure to third parties. The
Notice responds to a petition from the Electronic Privacy Information Center
("EPIC") expressing concern that current telecommunication carrier practices
are insufficient in protecting CPNI.
The Commission defines CPNI as highly-sensitive personal information obtained by a telecommunications carrier in the course of providing service to its
customers. Specifically, CPNI includes "information such as phone numbers
called by a consumer; the frequency, duration, and timing of such calls; and
any services purchased by the consumer, such as call waiting."
The Commission acknowledges its statutory obligation under 47 U.S.C. §
222 to protect CPNI from improper use and dissemination, and notes that it has
already imposed rules and restrictions on telecommunication carriers in pursuance of such obligation. For example, the Commission already requires telecommunication carriers to obtain a customer's knowledge and consent before
using or disclosing CPNI. The Commission also currently requires telecommunication carriers to instruct and train their employees about all the circumstances under which they are and are not allowed to disclose CPNI. In addition,
the Commission stipulates that telecommunications carriers must maintain records of all instances in which CPNI was disclosed, and they must certify annually and publicly their compliance with the carrier's CPNI requirements.
But, in light of the petition from EPIC, the Commission seeks comments on
whether its current rules and restrictions protecting against improper use of
CPNI are sufficient. EPIC asserts that CPNI is not adequately protected despite
the Commission's current rules. Namely, EPIC points out that numerous websites advertise the sale of personal telephone records. These websites claim to
be able to provide phone call records without the caller's knowledge or consent.
If its current CPNI rules and restrictions are insufficient, the Commission
seeks comments on what additional steps it can take to adequately protect
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CPNI. Specifically, the Commission seeks comments about the feasibility and
advisability of the five forms of security measures EPIC suggests requiring of
telecommunication carriers: (1) using consumer-set passwords (as opposed to
common biographical data that are readily available through public records);
(2) maintaining a record of all instances when a customer's records have been
assessed; (3) encrypting all personal records; (4) limiting data retention; and
(5) notifying customers when their CPNI may have been improperly disclosed.
In addition to comments on these suggestions, the Commission seeks additional proposals to enhance security and authentication standards for access to
CPNI.
The Commission finds extremely disturbing the possible availability of
CPNI for a price and seeks a solution that sufficiently protects CPNI. The
Commission, however, also acknowledges its responsibility to telecommunications carriers and does not want to unduly burden them with regulations that
are unnecessarily broad. Therefore, the Commission requests that proposals
submitted assess the burdens as well as the benefits of any specific measure
suggested. Lastly, pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601612 (2000), cites the Commission seeks comments on how additional measures
may affect small entities economically.
Summarized by ClareLiedquist
In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service; High-Cost Universal Service Support, Notice of ProposedRulemaking, FCC 05-205, CC
Docket No. 96-45, WC Docket No. 05-337 (Dec. 9, 2005)
In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPRM"), the Federal Communication Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") seeks comment on a number of
issues remanded by a federal appeals court earlier in the year regarding the
mechanism for distributing universal service support for non-rural carriers
serving high-cost areas. In response to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal's
decision in Qwest II v. FCC, 398 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2005), the Commission
seeks comment on how to define the terms "sufficient" and "reasonably comparable." Initially, the FCC defined the term "sufficient" as enough federal
support to enable states to achieve reasonable comparability of rural and urban
rates in high-cost areas served by non-rural carriers, and defined "reasonably
comparable" in terms of a national urban residential rate benchmark. In Qwest
II, the Tenth Circuit found the Commission's definitions inadequate. On remand, the court directed the Commission to consider the range of principles in
§ 254 of the Communications Act and define the terms in a manner that advances universal service.
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In addition, the Commission seeks comment on the non-rural high-cost support mechanisms. The current mechanism must be invalidated because it rests
on an inadequate definition of "reasonably comparable." A significant objective of a newly developed mechanism is to induce state action to preserve and
advance universal service. Finally, the Commission also seeks comment on a
proposal from the Puerto Rico Telephone Company, Inc. ("PRTC") for the
Commission to adopt a non-rural insular mechanism.
In attempting to define the term "sufficient," the court directed the Commission to consider all of the principles of § 254(b). However, the court found it
permissible for the Commission to give greater weight to one principle over
another. The Commission was also to take into account whether any principles
conflicted with each other and, if so, how to balance the principles in order to
resolve the conflict. The Commission should justify any approach it takes.
The court's rejection of the Commission's definition of "reasonably comparable" was based on the finding that the Commission erred when premising its
consideration of the term "preserve" on the disparity of rates existing in 1996
while ignoring its concurrent obligation to advance universal service-a concept that included a narrowing of the existing gap between urban and rural
rates. In defining the term "reasonably comparable," the Commission seeks
comment on whether to obtain additional data on rates; if additional rates are to
be obtained, comments regarding the source of the data; and comments regarding whether reasonably comparable rates should be defined in terms of local
rates only.
The Commission also seeks comment on the non-rural high-cost support
mechanism. The Qwest H court found the current mechanism invalid because it
rested on the inadequate definition of "reasonably comparable." The FCC
seeks comment regarding a rate-based universal service support mechanism. In
particular, the Commission wants comment on how a rate-based support
mechanism would be designed; what elements should such a rate mechanism
include; and whether such a rate should include other mandatory fees and
taxes.
Finally, PRTC requests high-cost universal service support through a nonrural insular support mechanism. PRTC requests, pending the Commission's
review of its high-cost support program, that the Commission adopt, on an interim basis, a non-rural insular mechanism based on embedded costs. PRTC
claims that high-cost support is essential for maintaining and expanding affordable telephone service in Puerto Rico. The Commission seeks comment on
its tentative conclusion that it has authority to establish a new interim support
mechanism for non-rural insular areas based on embedded costs. The Commission seeks comment on what impact the mechanism would have on the Universal Service Fund. The Commission also seeks comment on the comparison
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between the proposed mechanism and the one currently in force.
If the Commission adopts the tentative conclusion to establish a non-rural
insular mechanism it will need a definition of "insular areas." The Commission
proposed defining "insular areas" as "islands that are territories or commonwealths of the United States." The Commission seeks comment on whether the
definition should exclude sovereign nations that are not subject to the laws of
the United States. The Commission tentatively concluded that Puerto Rico,
Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,
and the U.S. Virgin Islands are properly included in the definition of insular
areas. Carriers currently serving these areas receive support based on embedded costs under the rural high-cost mechanisms and would not be affected by
the tentative conclusion.
Summarized by Raymond Milani
In re SBC Communications Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20
F.C.C.R. 18,290 (Oct. 31, 2005)

On October 31, 2005, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or
"Commission") released a Memorandum Opinion and Order ("Order") approving the merger of SBC Communications Inc. ("SBC") and AT&T Corp.
("AT&T") collectively ("Applicants"). In so doing, the Commission analyzed
the effects the merger might have upon competition in the relevant communications marketplaces; examined the potential public interest benefits resulting
from the merger that may flow to consumers; and, conditioned upon compliance with a Department of Justice ("DOJ") consent decree and other voluntary
concessions, concluded that the transfer of control would serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity.
According to the Order, two reviews were conducted prior to approval of the
merger. The DOJ's, Antitrust Division first reviewed the merger on the limited
issue of whether it would substantially lessen competition. The DOJ concluded
that where SBC and AT&T were the only direct connections to a particular
building, the merger would have such an effect. A consent decree was entered
between the Applicants and the DOJ wherein the Applicants agreed to divest
assets in the form of Indefeasible Rights of Use ("IRUs") to those buildings,
thus alleviating the anticompetitive effects and allowing DOJ approval of the
merger.
The Commission reviewed the merger on the broader issue of whether approval would serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity. Essentially,
this entailed determining whether the transaction would harm the public interest through anticompetitive effects, and weighing those harms against potential
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public interest benefits flowing from the transaction.
The Commission began their competitive analysis review by identifying key
services provided by the Applicants to include special access, retail enterprise,
mass market, Internet backbone, wholesale interexchange, and international
services. Next, the Commission identified the relevant markets and market participants, and analyzed the likely competitive effects of the merger upon each
of the key services seriatim. Like the DOJ review, the Commission analysis
found that where SBC and AT&T had sole access to special access lines, competition would be harmed and thus the public interest not served by approval of
the merger. Save special access, the Commission found that the transfer would
not produce anticompetitive effects in the remaining key services.
This is not to say that the Commissioners were in unanimous agreement regarding the merger's potential harm to the public interest. Rather, while
Chairman Martin and Commissioner Abernathy viewed there to be little potential harm, Commissioners Adelstein and Copps expressed, in separate concurring statements, their reservations regarding approval of the transaction. Seemingly predicting the latter Commissioners' apprehensions, the Applicants set
forth a set of voluntary concessions with which they would comply upon approval of the transfer of control. The concessions focused primarily on issues
related to the Commission's Internet Policy Statement, such as making "naked" stand-alone DSL available to consumers as an unbundled network element ("UNE") and maintaining open network peering policies, but also encompassed short-term rate freezes and input caps in the areas of special access
and UNEs respectively. The Commission deemed these commitments to be in
the public interest.
The Commission found the approval of the merger would likely result in
several merger-specific benefits that would be in the public interest. Specifically, the Commission identified enhanced national security and government
services, efficiency related to vertical integration, economies of scope and
scale, and cost synergies as likely benefits to the public interest flowing specifically from this merger. Although the Commission found it difficult to precisely quantify the magnitude of some of the benefits, they nonetheless held
that the merger-specific benefits flowing to the public were likely to be significant.
Having identified the potential public harms and benefits of the proposed
merger, the Commissioners were divided as to the outcome of the balance.
Chairman Martin and Commissioner Abernathy viewed the benefits as outweighing the harms, while Commissioners Adelstein and Copps found it to be
a closer call. After postponing the decision for several days, the Commissioners were able to reconcile their differing viewpoints. The resulting agreement
imposed the aforementioned DOJ consent decree, along with the Applicants'
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voluntary commitments, as express conditions for the approval of transfer of
control. With these conditions in place, the Commission voted to approve the
applications.
Summarized by Gaetano Parrinello
In re Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI, Inc.; Applications for
Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20
F.C.C.R. 18,433 (Oct. 31, 2005).
In this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") evaluated the merits of the applications for the proposed merger of Verizon Communications, Inc. ("Verizon")
and MCI, Inc. ("MCI"). Under the proposed agreement, MCI would become a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Verizon. The agreement calls for MCI to merge
with and into Verizon, leaving Verizon as the surviving company. Coming off
the heels of high profile mergers such as SCB with AT&T and Sprint with
Nextel, this merger would continue an apparent trend of ongoing change in the
industry. In their review, the FCC focused on the effects the merger would
have on competition in a range of communications markets, as well as on the
effects on public interest, convenience, and necessity. The Commission concluded that the proposed transfers would not only benefit the public interest,
but that they were unlikely to result in anticompetitive effects in relevant markets. As a result, the Commission approved the transfer applications.
MCI offers mass markets and business customers a range of services within
the communications industry, including local voice services, domestic and international long-distance services, data services, and IP virtual private networks (IP-VPN), among others. Further, they provide managed services including network design, maintenance, security, and web hosting. MCI holds a
number of Commission licenses and authorizations both domestically and internationally, with facilities throughout parts of North America, Europe, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific region. Formerly known as WorldCom, Inc., the
company filed for bankruptcy in 2002, and emerged in 2004 as MCI, rearranged into three new business segments-Enterprise Markets, U.S. Sales and
Service, and International and Wholesale Markets.
Verizon, a holding company, provides communication services in the United
States and abroad through subsidiary companies. It offers local, long-distance,
high-speed Internet and wireless services, either alone or in various packages,
throughout twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia. It also has a
stronghold over the wireless market as a majority owner of Verizon Wireless,
which boasts 43.8 million voice and data subscribers throughout the United
States. For the year ending December 31, 2004, Verizon reported $71.3 billion
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in operating revenues and a net income of $7.8 billion.
The merger of Verizon and MCI would combine one of the largest regional
Bell Operating Companies with one of the largest providers of interexchange
and competitive local service. More specifically, it would unite Verizon's
broadband, wireless, and local wireline networks with MCI's Internet backbone and global reach to the benefit of the public. The application contends
that this will benefit large businesses by creating a much stronger competitor
with broader network reach and competitive financial resources. It would also
benefit both government and national security through enhanced investment in
national and international communications infrastructure used by the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. In addition, mass market consumers
would benefit from the establishment of the nation's most advanced broadband
platform, able to deliver next-generation multimedia services throughout the
nation. The transaction would also generate synergies that would save costs
and enhance revenue opportunities, yielding a net present value of $7 billion.
The Commission agreed that, pursuant to §§ 214 and 310(d) of the Communications Act, the merger would indeed provide numerous public interest benefits that outweigh any limited public harms.
In addition to examining the effects the merger would have on public interest, the Commission must also consider how it would affect competition, both
horizontally and vertically. In terms of relevant product markets, the Commission evaluated the effects on "Type I" special access services (those which are
offered wholly over a carrier's own facilities) and "Type II" special access services (those offered using a combination of the carrier's own facilities for two
segments, with the third segment being provided for by another carrier). It also
took into account relevant geographic markets and market participants, ultimately concluding that the merger is not likely to have anticompetitive effects
in any relevant markets. While it recognizes that there will be an increase in
market concentration in several areas (including mass market services and special access services), the Commission finds that any possible harms that may
arise from the merger do not justify its denial.
Overall, the Commission gives significant weight to the positive benefits
that will arise from the proposed merger when taken as a whole. It further accepts the commitment the Applicants offered regarding special access, standalone DSL, Internet backbone services, and the Commission's Internet Policy
Statement.
With the acceptance of the proposed merger of Verizon and MCI, the Commission appears to favor the ongoing changes pervading throughout the communications industry.
Summarized by Jennifer K Valentin
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In re Petition of Qwest Corporation for Forbearance Pursuant to 47
U.S.C. § 160(c) in the Omaha Metropolitan Statistical Area, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, FCC 05-170, WC Docket No. 04-223 (Sept. 16, 2005),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-05-170AI.pdf.
In 2005, Qwest Corporation ("Qwest") petitioned the FCC for forbearance
from certain required regulatory and statutory obligations based on its status as
an incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC") in the Omaha Metropolitan Statistical Area ("MSA"). Qwest had filed the petition pursuant 47 U.S.C. §
160(c) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("the Act") which allows telecommunication carriers to petition the FCC requesting forbearance from regulatory obligations if there is evidence of competition in the telecommunications
marketplace where the carrier is providing services.
Qwest requested forbearance from dominant carrier regulations related to its
mass market services and enterprise services, as well as forbearance from obligations enunciated under §§ 251 and 271 related to its provision of services in
the Omaha MSA. In particular, Qwest requested forbearance from requirements under §§ 271(c)(2)(B)(i)-(vi) and (xiv).3 In a September 2005 decision,
the FCC granted Qwest's request for forbearance from dominant carrier obligations in relation to its provision of mass market exchange access services
and its mass market broadband Internet access services in the Omaha MSA. It
also granted Qwest's request for forbearance from certain obligations under §§
251(c)(3) and 271 of the Act.
The FCC must forbear from applying any provision of the Act if it determines that "(1) enforcement of the regulation is not necessary to ensure that
charges and practices are just and reasonable, and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory; (2) enforcement of the regulation is not necessary to
3 Section 271 requires telecommunications providers that offer interLATA services to
satisfy fourteen "Competitive Checklist" requirements enunciated in § 271(c)(2)(B) of the
Act prior to gaining authorization from the FCC to provide access or interconnection services to other telecommunications carriers. After the providers obtain § 271 authority, the
initial requirements become ongoing obligations. The requirements that Qwest requested
forbearance from were: (1) § 271(2)(B)(i), Interconnection in accordance with the requirements of §§ 251(c)(2) and 252 (d)(1); (2) § 271(2)(B )(ii), Nondiscriminatory access to network elements in accordance with the requirements of §§ 251(c)(3) and 252(d)(1); (3) §

271(2)(B)(iii), Nondiscriminatory access to the poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way

owned or controlled by the Bell operating company at just and reasonable rates in accordance with the requirements of § 224; (4) § 271(2)(B)(iv), Local loop transmission from the
central office to the customer's premises, unbundled from local switching or other services;
(5) § 271(2)(B)(v), Local transport from the trunk side of a wireline local exchange carrier
switch unbundled from switching or other services; § 271(2)(B )(vi), Local switching unbundled from transport, local loop transmission, or other services; and (6) § 271(2)(B)(xiv),

Telecommunications services are available for resale in accordance with the requirements of
§§ 251(c)(4) and 252(d)(3).
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protect consumers; and (3) forbearance is consistent with the public interest."
47 U.S.C. § 160(a). In determining whether or not to grant a request, the FCC
must consider whether forbearance would promote competitive market conditions.
The FCC applied the forbearance criteria to each of Qwest's requests in order to determine whether it was a dominant or non-dominant carrier in the
Omaha MSA. The FCC determined that dominant carrier regulations for mass
market exchange access and broadband Internet access services were unneeded
due to the competitive nature of the marketplace. In particular, it granted
Qwest relief from regulations concerning dominant carrier price caps, rate of
return, tariffing, and rate averaging because they were no longer necessary to
ensure that prices in the marketplace are just and reasonable. The FCC conditioned its grant of forbearance on Qwest's compliance with competitive carrier
regulations. The FCC did not grant Qwest's request for forbearance from regulations in connection to its enterprise services because it determined that Qwest
failed to provide enough area-wide information about enterprise services in the
Omaha MSA.
The FCC also granted Qwest's request for forbearance from its obligations
under §§ 271(c)(2)(B)(i)-(vi) and (xiv). It found that Qwest had satisfied the §
160(d) mandate that all regulatory requirements be "fully implemented" within
the marketplace based on Qwest's § 271 authority in Nebraska and Iowa. Subsequently, Qwest's petition for forbearance was granted. The FCC also found
sufficient facilities-based competition in the Omaha MSA and therefore
granted Qwest's petition for forbearance from § 251 (c)(3) requirements. It did
not find that Qwest satisfied any other criteria for forbearance from obligations
under §§ 251(c)(1), (2), (4), (5), and (6). Finally, the FCC rejected Qwest's
petition for forbearance from regulation as an ILEC. The FCC determined that
Qwest failed to sufficiently identify the objects of its request or provide support for how the request would serve the public's interest.
Summarized by Stefanie Zalewski

